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THE ANTINOMY OF FREEDOM AND NECESSITY
AND THE PROBLEM OF MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY/
BY H. M. GORDIN.
AS is well known to students of philosophy, the free-will problem,
- or Kant's third antinomy, consists in the following: The law
of causation is, so far as our experience goes, so universal that it is
utterly unreasonable to exempt human activity from its control.
On the other hand, there are several arguments which, it is claimed,
prove or favor the doctrine that within certain limitations a freeman
is free of the inexorability of this law. While this subject has been
discussed by numerous writers, I am not familiar with any book or
paper where all the arguments of the libertarians are successfully
answered. Most probably none exists, as otherwise modern erudite
writers, e. g., the author of the article on free will in the Encyclo-
pcsdia Britannica, 11th ed., Vol. XXVIII, p. 654, and the author of
the article on the same subject in the Encyclopccdia of Religion and
Ethics, Vol. VI, pp. 124-127, would not defend the doctrine of liber-
tarianism. I shall therefore answer the arguments of the liber-
tarians in what I consider a perfectly convincing manner, and show
that the doctrine of determinism is in accord with facts, while that
of libertarianism is not, unless the latter defines freedom of the will
or freedom of choice so as to agree with facts, when it becomes
identical with determinism. I shall further show that determinism
allows the freeman acting within the range of his possibilities all
the freedom of action and choice he can possibly wish to possess, and
that this amount of freedom is, within this range, so great that it is
perfectly inconceivable how it could be greater.
Let us first state the arguments of the libertarians.
1 The material of this article will be incorporated in a book on Science,
Truth, Religion and Ethics which I am preparing for publication.
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1. The freeman is capable of doing the reverse of what he is
imputed to be compelled to do. This may be illustrated by the
following example: Suppose that a libertarian starts to travel east
in order to get some particular thing. He will, of course, claim that
nothing compels him to go in that direction. Now, let a determinist
remind him of the fact that his going east is not free of causation
because the attraction of the thing he is after actually compels him
to go there. The traveler can prove his independence by turning on
his heels, and go west. As a freeman, he certainly can do that. Since
there can be no better proof by which a freeman may prove his
freedom from compulsion than doing the opposite of what he is
claimed to be compelled to do, the traveler's ability to reverse his
decision ought, it is claimed, to be accepted as conclusive for prov-
ing that his acts are free of the restraints of causality.
2. In his voluntary activity, man, it is asserted, is perfectly
unconscious of any force compelling him to act in a particular
manner. If causality regulated his actions he certainly ought to be
conscious of its power.
3. The doctrine of determinism is said to be degrading and
depressing, converting even a freeman into a slave of an inexorable
law, since he must do what the latter compels him to do. It is further
claimed that, if determinism be true, man cannot have the slightest
influence on the course of events, every event being predetermined
by immutable antecedent causes.
4. If determinism were true, moral responsibility, it is claimed,
would lose its significance, since no one could feel remorse for the
committal of a wrong if he admitted that, owing to causality, he
could not have acted otherwise. The libertarian further asserts
that the State would have no justification for punishing criminals,
and that the improvement of man's moral character would be im-
possible if all human acts were predetermined by immutable causes.
Before answering these arguments, let us examine the nature
of the acts that are involved in the controversy between the liber-
tarians and the determinists. It is self-evident that acts which are
beyond the ability of the actor to perform and acts which are com-
mitted unconsciously must be ruled out of our discussion : the
former he, of course, never commits, and in committing the latter
he cannot be said freely to choose his actions. Another category
of acts that must be excluded are those which are involuntary,
defining by this term acts which are imposed on one by an irresis-
tible power and are condemned by the judgment of the actor, such
as the unwillingly performed acts of a slave. Still another category
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of acts that are not involved in the controversy are those which,
like the preceding, are condemned by one's own judgment, and
which are therefore never committed by an intelligent person unless
he is under the influence of intoxicants, or in a fit of overwhelming
passion when his mind is in a state of almost complete aberration,
or when he acts under the influence of irresistible cravings or habits
from which he would like to but has no will-power to break away.
The acts of this category, too, are involuntary and obviously not
causeless, the impulses to commit them being certain peculiarities
in the nervous system of the actor. Hence even the libertarian
must admit that they are not the results of free choices, but the
inexorable consequence of forces over which the actor has little or
no control.
The only acts that are involved in the controversy under dis-
cussion are therefore those which are voluntary, defining by this
term acts which are not forced on the actor by an external master
or an irresistible craving, passion, or habit, and are approved or at
least not condemned by his own judgment. It is these that the liber-
tarian claims are free of the restraints of causation.
The next step is to state clearly the claim of the determinist,
and to show that it is in accord with facts. The claim consists in
that voluntary acts are caused by desires, and that the choices be-
tween different voluntary acts are caused by the most approved
and strongest of the desires, though the latter are not intense enough
to be such irresistible cravings as to make the acts involuntary.
The desires involved may be for the acts themselves or for their
direct or indirect results, but desires there must be, and, when
choice is exercised, they must be stronger and more approved than
the desires for any other acts or their results that are appropriate
to the occasion. In accord with this claim, when in respect to a
given act a freeman says, I hate to but will none the less commit
it, what he means is that he hates the act but likes its results, and
likes them more than he likes any other suitable act or its results.
The correctness of this claim is proved by the most reliable
method we have at our disposal, and that is, by interrogating the
actor committing a voluntary act. Our traveler, for instance, will
admit that, in accord with the claim of the determinist, he goes
east because he desires a certain thing which he cannot get at home,
that when he reverses his action he does so because the argument
of the determinist created in him a new desire—the desire to con-
fute his opponent—and that this desire is stronger and more ap-
proved than that for the thing he started out to get. In fact, should
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the thino^ in the east happen to be to him of exceptional vakie, he
will admit that he would brush aside his adversary and continue
his journey eastward, telling the determinist that his desire for
the thing there, while not an irresistible craving, is nevertheless so
strong that he would not stop to bother about philosophical an-
tinomies at that moment, and that he would discuss the matter with
him at some more opportune time. Similarly, the voluntary act of
a patient taking bitter and ill-smelling medicine is caused by his
desire to improve his health, and this desire obviously is stronger
and more approved than that for taking something pleasant that
might either harm him or do him no good. In the same way, the
average volunteer who is willing to sacrifice his life in defense of
his fatherland will tell you that his desire to do his duty to his
country is stronger and more approved than that for staying at
home while his native land is being attacked by a foe, that he
prefers the moral exaltation and the short life of a hero to the des-
picable and universally reprobated though longer life of a slacker.
So much for the causality of the voluntary acts themselves. As
to desires and the choices between them, they, too, are not causeless,
their causes being in most cases perfectly well known. Thus, his
desire for going east the traveler will doubtless ascribe to the fact
that the thing there will satisfy certain of his wants, and when he
goes back on his original decision, he will admit that his desire
to refute the claim of the determinist is caused by a feeling of
pride in the correctness of his views on the free-will problem, as
well as by a feeling of contrariness, or combativeness, and that the
combined effect of these feelings is stronger than the feeling creat-
ing in him the desire for the thing in the east. The desire of the
patient for improving his health obviously is due to his sense of
self-perservation which under ordinary conditions creates excep-
tionally strong and approved desires for taking and doing things
promoting our well-being, even when they are in themselves dis-
agreeable. Finally, the desire of the volunteer to do his duty is
the result of his moral sense which in the moral man creates power-
ful and highly approved desires to be moral.
If desires be pursued still further backward, it will be found
that even the causes of their causes are, at least in some cases, well
known. Thus, the causal series involved in the act of going to
dinner is as follows : act of going desire for food feeling
of hunger certain changes in certain sensory nerves with-
holding nourishment from the cells of our bodies. That is about
as far as we need go, since the terms of the series lying beyond the
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withholding of nourishment vary from case to case, and are of
no importance in our discussion. But even when we cannot go as
far as in this case, there is no reason for assuming that the series
comes to a stop where we are compelled to stop, because a similar
state of affairs is met with in the examination of every natural
phenomenon without exception. Proceeding backward along the
series of successive causes of any observed occurrence, we neces-
sarily arrive at a term whose antecedents are unknown, but that
does not prove that no antecedents exist. The fact that diligent
research frequently discovers hitherto unknown causes justifies the
assumption that the chain of causality is infinite. The only legiti-
mate alternatives to this assumption are that the chain ends in a
property that is as inherent in the last term as it is inherent in
human intelligence that two and two must equal four, or else that
it ends in a causa finalis, according to whichever assumption one
prefers. Thus, the moral sense may be as inherent in the moral
man as are his feelings of shame, sympathy, regret, and love of
music, or may be due to some antecedent causes. When the free-
will problem reaches this point, the determinist has already proved
his thesis, because all he claims is that human activity is as subject
to causality as the rest of the world with which we are familiar.
Why our consciousness or mind or ego or soul or whatever be the
name of the human vis vitae interprets changes in our nervous
system as feelings, and why these create desires, are perfectly idle
questions. Operations of this sort are essential attributes of con-
scious life; in their absence one is dead or at least unconscious.
Why feelings and desires have certain particular forms, i. e., why
they are so and so, and not otherwise, is also an idle question, be-
cause since they must have some form, one form is, in the absence
of further light on the subject, as reasonable as another. As to
their general uniformity for a given person, this is obviously due to
his general make-up which is to a large extent constant throughout
his life, and in so far as it is not constant, his feelings and desires
really vary with his conditions and advancing age. Still more idle is
the question why our reasoning faculty operates in such a manner as
to approve or condemn certain desires. It must operate according
to definite fixed rules of human logic, and must make use of the
memory of past events and of the probability that, owing to the in-
exorability of causation, certain pleasant or unpleasant, moral or
immoral, consequences are more liable to be the results of certain
actions than certain other consequences. It must therefore work in
a more or less definite manner, and its working in a certain particu-
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lar manner is due to the structure of one's brain and to the numer-
ous factors constituting one's personality.
That human activity is subject to causaHty is further proved by
the fact that, as indicated above, one's acts vary in a more or less
definite manner v^ith one's age, sex, nationality, inherited character-
istics, education, surroundings, etc. A complete knowledge of all
of the numerous and complex factors influencing the desires of a
given person would doubtless enable a psychologist to read his mind
and foretell his actions under given conditions. To a considerable
extent this ability is really possessed by many people having had
much worldly experience and thus gained a good "knowledge of
men." This would be perfectly impossible if desires, choices, and
acts were causeless and therefore unpredictable.
Another proof is that when one of the terms in the series of
successive causes of an act is inhibited, all the subsequent terms
drop out. When the feeling of hunger is destroyed by a sudden
shock of fright or bad news the desire for food vanishes, and the
act of going to dinner is stopped. When a moral person who is on
the point of committing an act approved or not condemned by his
judgment, hears or reads arguments which prove that under the
given conditions the act would be immoral, his desire for commit-
ting it is overcome by a more approved and stronger desire to be
moral, and the act is not committed. When a nerve-center is seri-
ously injured, all the feelings, desires, and actions controlled by it
disappear.
Having shown that all human activity is controlled by causality,
so that the first argument of the libertarians is untenable, it is easy
to show that the second argument also is untenable. In his voluntary
activity man is unconscious of any external authority and of irre-
sistible condemned cravings driving him to action because such
authority and such cravings are by definition absent from such
activity, but he is fully conscious of the force of his strongest
desires and of the logicity of the strongest arguments approving
them, or of the absence of arguments condemning them. When
hungry we are conscious of a powerful desire for food and of the
cogent argument that if we want to live we must eat, and that
under ordinary conditions we have a moral right to eat. And when
our sound judgment tells us that, owing to our corpulency, it would
be better for us to omit a meal, or that for moral reasons it would
be preferable to give it to a starving person, there immediately
arises in our consciousness a strong and approved desire to follow
the counsel of our reason, and we are again fully conscious of the
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new desire and of the soundness of our judgment. In our daily
conscious life we are frequently confronted with several conflicting
desires, moral, immoral, and amoral, and with reasoning arguments
advising different choices. Particularly when the voluntar}^ actions
involved are of special importance do we feel that we are thrown
upon our own resources ; we hesitate, compare, sift, and argue with
ourselves before making up our minds how to act. During this
interval of time, which sometimes is of considerable duration, we
are fully conscious of an inner struggle for supremacy between
different desires and different processes of argumentation. Until
we reach a decision we are particularly impressed with our freedom
of choice between different desires because we are in the midst of
a confusion which we may bring to order any way we like, and
because we do not yet know which of our desires and judgments
will come out victorious. The inexorable necessity of following the
strongest desire and worthiest motive is thus hidden because we
do not yet know which is the strongest and worthiest. When,
however, we reach a conclusion and finally decide upon a definite
mode of action, we are perfectly conscious of the fact that our action
corresponds with that desire for it which during the inner fight has
become stronger than the rest and has received the support of the
best arguments. At that moment we become extremely conscious
of the necessity of causality because in committing a voluntary
act under these conditions we know full well why we are doing
it as well as what we are doing. It is only in performing routine
work that a man is not fully conscious of the fact that his acts
are compelled by his desires and judgments, but this is so because
such work meets with no resistance from within or without. No-
body interferes with it, and the actor feels no strong desires for
refraining from doing it. It is performed in a mechanical way
requiring little attention. The moment, however, some remark,
thought or external phenomenon causes him to conceive a desire
for doing something else, he feels the necessity of making a choice,
and when he makes it he feels that his choice is the inexorable result
of his strongest desire and strongest argument. Hence the second
argument of the libertarian is, like the first, contrary to facts.
In order to answer the third argument, let us examine the
nature of the compulsion causality imposes on the freeman. Since
this compulsion amounts to nothing more than that in performing
a voluntary act he must follow his own most approved and strongest
desire which he loves to satisfy anyway, the law of causation is
in this case entirely deprived of its sting of tyranny. It is perfectly
THE ANTINOMY OF FREEDOM AND NECESSITY. 177
clear that when a person' has a strong and approved or at least not
condemned desire to commit an act he would commit it with no
greater zeal even if the desire for it dropped into his heart out of
the blue sky without any cause whatsoever, or if he manufactured
it himself es niJiilo. If a man be asked what sort of freedom of
action he would like to have as far as his possibilities go, he would
certainly want no other variety than freedom to satisfy his strongest,
approved, or at least uncondemned desires without the interference
of irresistible undesirable forces. This degree of freedom deter-
minism allows the voluntarily acting freeman ; this degree of free-
dom is all he wants for his voluntary acts, and this degree of free-
dom is so great that, within the limits of what the freeman can do.
it is inconceivable how it could be greater. Our traveler, for in-
stance, goes east when he himself likes the thing there more than
to confute his opponent, and he can and does reverse his original
decision when the claim of his adversary rouses in him a stronger
liking for maintaining the doctrine of his independence. He cannot
do both things simultaneously : he must and, as a rule, likes to do
either one or the other thing, and he actually acts as he likes to act.
As far as the act of going in some particular direction is concerned,
there can be no greater freedom of choice than is possessed by the
freeman. Hence the doctrine of determinism bestows upon the
freeman so much freedom that, barring impossibilities, there is
nothing left for the libertarian to give him.
To claim, as the libertarian in his third argurrient does, that
in his voluntary activity man must feel depressed by the necessity
of following his own strongest desires is as absurd as to claim that a
ma» who is hungry and freezing, and who does not want to let
himself starve or freeze to death, but longs for a good meal and a
warm bed. would feel depressed if his friend picked him up on the
street and forcibly placed him in a well-provisioned palatial resi-
dence where he may eat and drink and do anything he likes and
can. Furthermore, since even the strongest desires for voluntary
acts are not so irresistible as to become overpowering cravings, the
fact that such acts are forced by causality is less burdensome than
the act of the man forcibly placing his starving and freezing friend
in the house of plenty. Thus, in going east our traveler is not
driven by an irresistible craving, since in that case his act would
not be voluntary. Some particular occurrence or some cogent
argument might create in him a stronger and more approved desire
to go in some other direction, or stay where he is, and determinism
permits him to do that. Similarly, the volunteer, who is making
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preparations for going to the front in order to do his duty to his
country, usually is not driven by the whip of an irresistible craving,
because in that case his act would not be voluntary and would
therefore not be moral at all, for an act committed under the in-
fluence of an irresistible force of any kind is no more moral than
one committed per order of the chief of police. The democratic
volunteer may, for instance, all at once become convinced, rightly
or wrongly, that his country has become an autocratic tyranny
that does not deserve to be defended. He would then change his
action and stay at home.
If man has some reason to be dissatisfied it is not because his
voluntary activity is forced on him by the necessity of following
his own desires and judgments which have their immutable causes,
but because the range of this sort of activity is not as wide as he
would like it to be, i. e., because his possibilities are limited, since
he is often the slave of his own passions or of somebody else's will,
while in some cases his freedom of choice is limited to choosing
the lesser of two evils. In other words, it is only in respect to
acts that even the libertarian admits to be compulsory that man
may feel depressed. The question whether it is prudent and
justifiable for the man of our enlightened age to shed, tears over
what he cannot do instead of enjoying what he can do and has
already done, I shall discuss on another occasion. Here it may
suffice to point out that man's ability to perform voluntary acts
should be to him a source of great satisfaction, since such acts
imply the possession of a reasoning faculty which is far superior
to that of every known creature, and to which he owes his civili-
zation. A being devoid of this faculty is incapable of voluntary
activity, all his acts being committed without deliberation, as direct
results of his immediate impulses. The educated freeman should
therefore not feel depressed and degraded but delighted by, and
proud of, his ability and necessity to hesitate and deliberate and
approve before acting. Our feelings, like our children, frequently
bring us sorrow as well as joy; our reasoning faculty is our best
friend and most reliable guardian. It is not the causality of our
voluntary activity, but that of the physical phenomena and our own
carelessness that sometimes bring us in trouble and may therefore
cause a depression of our spirits. When a man gets hurt by falling
out of a window, he may feel dissatisfied with his carelessness and
the law of gravity, but when he voluntarily constructs a chute and
slides down in order to escape from fire, he is mighty glad that this
same law enables him to save his life by carrying out his voluntary
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act, that his approved desire prompts him to carry it out, and that
his reasoning faculty enables him to construct such an appliance.
As to influencing the course of events, it is a fact that man
does have strong desires to improve himself and the conditions
of life on his little planet, and that nature does not interfere in his
activity as long as he obeys her laws. She even allows him to pit
them against each other any way he likes, thus letting herself be
subdued to his needs. In the course of his evolution, man's desires
have multiplied, and just because he is compelled to find ways and
means for satisfying them he has changed and is constantly changing
the face of the earth and the institutions of society. This is an
undeniable fact, and whether one believes in libertarianism or de-
terminism, it is a cheerful fact.
It is true that the law of causation makes all future events,
including those in which man takes part, predetermined by the past
and the present, so that a being knowing all the causes which have
operated and are operating in the world could foretell the course
of all events to come. But such a being would also know that the
human race is an integral part of the world, and that in following our
desires and judgments we are influencing the course of events in
accord with the law of causation. This again is a fact, a part of
the scheme of the constantly changing world. What difference
would it make to us if some being knew beforehand what sorts of
desires we and our successors were going to have, what kinds of
acts we and they will be compelled by causality to perform, and
what part our activity will play in shaping historical events? A
mother usually knows what her child will want on opening its eyes
in the morning, but that does not prevent the child from actually
shaping her actions by demanding and getting what it wants, and
from enjoying the feeling that it is the pet and lord of the house-
hold. I know that my neighbor, who is very fond of music, is
going to attend the opera next season. Does my knowledge en-
croach upon his freedom of action? Moreover, even if man himself
had a complete knowledge of the future he would not lose his
freedom of action and choice because he would then have strong
desires to mould his activity accordingly. That this is so is proved
by the fact that we feel and enjoy our freedom and deliberately
follow our approved desires even when we have known to a cer-
tainty what they were going to be. We plan our theater parties
days or weeks ahead, the details of our vacations months ahead,
and the careers of our children years ahead, and at the time of
realizing our plans we enjoy them in perfect freedom and with
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as much delight as if they were created on the spur of the moment.
In fact, we Hke nothing better than that our plans should not, on
account of some outside interference, miscarry, though we know
that they have been determined long ago.
It follows from our discussion that there is not the slightest
contradiction between freedom and necessity. Freedom means free-
dom from external powers and disapproved irresistible cravings,
which characterizes voluntary acts and gives the freeman the op-
portunity to act according to his own wishes and judgments. In
this respect the freeman has freedom of choice. Necessity, on the
other hand, means that voluntary acts are the immutable results
of the most approved and strongest desires. In this respect man
is compelled to choose. The inexorability of this necessity consists
in that it is perfectly inconceivable why a freeman should not
realize his voluntary acts. He loves to commit such acts, it is
within his power to commit them, and his best friend and guardian
—his own reason—approves or at least does not condemn their
committal. Why, in the name of common sense, should he not
commit them? Kant's third antinomy is therefore a pure fiction
without foundation in reality.
Before answering the fourth argument of the libertarians, let
us inquire into the meaning of their claims. If the doctrine of
libertarianism claims for the freeman nothing more than freedom
to act according to his own desires and judgments which, as shown
above, are subject to causality, it is identical with determinism.
If this doctrine claims that voluntary acts are free of the restraints
of causality, it is contrary to facts. Moreover, this sort of freedom
most probably does not exist anywhere in the world as we know
it, and even assuming that it does exist in respect to some particular
phenomenon, it obviously is not this sort that is involved in volun-
tary activity. A body moving about unconsciously and without any
cause whatsoever, constantly or every once in a while changing the
direction and rate of its motion for no reason and to no purpose,
and having nothing to say about anything pertaining to its migra-
tions, would exhibit an example of a causeless phenomenon. A
freeman does not resemble such a stupid errant body, he would
hate the purposeless freedom it possesses, and his voluntary acts,
being conscious, desired, examined by his own judgment, and di-
rected toward definite aims, are entirely dififerent from its aimless
peregrinations.
If the libertarian means that in advising particular choices
man's reasoning faculty is not guided by causal necessities, but is
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merely telling the freeman that he must act thus and so without point-
ing out to him the inexorable consequences \yhich, owing to causal-
ity, will probably or certainly follow his actions, the claim is self-
cojitradictory, because an agency acting in this manner would not
be a reasoning entity. By its very definition the reasoning faculty
must make use of logical arguments whose very essence consists
in that certain acts will serve as inexorable causes of certain pleas-
ant or impleasant, moral or immoral, consequences, thus creating
strong desires for obtaining or avoiding the latter.
If libcrtarianism means that man possesses an entity called
will, or what Bergson calls elan vital, which produces impulses
that have no causes or have causes incomprehensible to our in-
tellect, and delivers categorical imperatives without regard to our
reasoning faculty, the claim is again contrary to facts, since, as was
shown above, the causes of our desires or impulses usually are
well known and are subjected to the judgment of our reason before
they are allowed to serve as motives for voluntary acts. Moreover,
such an entity, even if it were guided b}'' some mysterious causes,
would have to be placed at the beginning of causal series as a
causa finalis. But it Avas already pointed out that the assumption
of the existence of final causes does n.ot violate the doctrine of
determinism. Finally, if man' possessed such an irraiional entity,
only the insane, the stupid, and little children would obey its des-
potic and unexplained commands ; the sane and educated freeman.
who loves his independence and prides himself on the possession
of much intelligence, would certainly consult and obey his reasoning
faculty before committing a voluntary act. The voice of the irra-
tional entity would therefore be a cry in the wilderness without any
influence on the voluntary activity of the intelligent freeman. Hence
libcrtarianism is either identical with determinism, merely applying
to that phase of voluntary activity which makes it possible for the
freeman to follow his own strongest desires and best arguments,
or is a false theory that should be discarded.
We shall now attack the problem of moral responsibility. In
addition to implying sormdness of mind, the term, moral responsi-
bility is usually given two meanings: (1) that of accountability for
harm one has already done, and (2) that of obligation to do no harm
in the future. From a practical point of view, the second is much
more important than the first, since it is much more important to
prevent future harm than merely to find out why harm was done.
The libertarian holds sane people responsible for their acts in both
of the above senses, while the determinist holds them responsible
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only in the second meaning of the term. The former assumes that
they could have acted otherwise than they did, while the latter
asserts that the fact that they have acted in a particular manner
proves, that, taking into consideration all the factors which have
influenced their past conduct, such as heredity, conditions, personal
idiosyncrasies, etc., they could not have acted otherwise. In the
light of the arguments of this paper, the view of the libertarian is
untenable. But even assuming, for the sake of argument, that a
criminal could have acted' differently, his treatment by the State
would be the same. When the harm of one's past act is rectifiable,
it will be rectified even if it was committed against or without one's
volition. Stolen goods will be returned to their owners even when
one was compelled by somebody else to steal, or when they were
stolen by a somnambulist. When the harm is irremediable, no
amount of punishment will remedy it. Revenge as justification for
punishment is nowadays considered unworthy of a moral and civi-
lized State.
As to future acts, it is clear that when a past act is not followed
by consequences disagreeable to the actor he and others will most
probably repeat it when circumstances are propitious, but when it
brings dire results they will create in him and others new and strong
desires that may overcome their desire for repeating it or doing
anything like it. This is one of the two justifications the community
has for punishing crimes committed by people in a state of perfect
sanity, the other being the sense of self-protection, since crimes are
detrimental to the welfare of the community. Since the knowledge
of the certainty of punishment for misbehavior exercises a salubrious
influence on prospective criminals, creating in them strong desires
for staying on the path of righteousness,
.
punishment for crimes
must be inflicted in order to prove this certainty, though we know
that a past act could not have been avoided. The claim that the
doctrine of determinism deprives the State of all justification of
punishing criminals is therefore erroneous.
Equally erroneous are the other claims of the fourth argument.
The claim that determinism deprives moral obligation of its signifi-
cance is without foundation because the moral person feels the
necessity of satisfying the demands of his moral sense, and he
also feels his ability to decide in most cases which acts are moral
and which immoral. Admitting this, he thereby admits his respon-
sibility for whatever he intends to do, and actually tries to be moral.
This is all we can expect him to do, and this is all we want by
holding him responsible, and as long as he does try to be moral,
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he feels himself and others consider him responsible for his present
and future conduct. When, however, an act has past out of his
control by having been carried away into the past by the irrever-
sible flow of time, no one can claim that he could have acted other-
wise, though, as said above, he must be punished for having acted
immorally. Responsibility and punishment are therefore perfectly
compatible with the doctrine of determinism.
Remorse for the committal of wrong acts is felt only by the
moral libertarian, and even he soon comes to see the utter useless-
ness of crying over spilt milk. With the moral determinist remorse
is a feeling of sincere regret for a deplorable though unavoidable
past occurrence, and with him, too, the feeling is the deeper the
greater the harm resulting from the act. Since the attention of
most people is concentrated chiefly on the present and the future,
since they feel the freedom of acting according to their own desires
and judgments, and since they are not philosophers analyzing the
forces underlying and determining their activity, the doctrine of
determinism is either unknown or does not appeal to them. Be-
lieving that they could have changed their actions, they readily
fall prey to the feeling of remorse. In so far as influencing future
conduct is concerned, the regret of the determinist is as efficacious
as the remorse of the libertarian.
As to the improvement of man's moral character, the State has
the ability of instructing the young citizen in the principles of
ethics, thus developing and strengthening his moral sense, in addi-
tion to frequently drawing his attention to the fact that, even from
a purely practical point of view, moral conduct is preferable to
immoral, because, as a rule, wrong doing brings woe, ostracism,
and punishment to the wrong-doer. The State has therefore the
power to mould the character of the citizen to a considerable extent,
to create in him strong desires for moral behavior, thus contributing
to making a moral man of a young person who, left to himself,
might grow up to be a scoundrel. The doctrine of determinism
does not prevent the State from doing so, since the acts are yet to
be performed, and can therefore be influenced. Determinism merely
claims that when the State does so it is forced by a sense of duty
to its citizens. Sound moral education, punishment for, and public
disapproval of, immorality have in the past contributed to the evo-
lution of moral man from the amoral savage, and the application
of these factors in the future will contribute to the further progress
of our race along ethical lines.
